Achieving airplane-like safety and reliability on ETO launch systems requires fundamental changes in vehicle propulsion and flight trajectories. Current launch systems all have extended regions where catastrophic engine failure means loss-of-vehicle (LOV) either through loss of control or insufficient thrust to weight (T/W < 1.0). These regions have been euphemistically termed "dead zones" for obvious reasons. The most straightforward solution is to supply extra engines to give "engine-out capability", but this approach has limited use because of the additional cost and weight penalties, and the fact that uncontained engine failures will often result in "engine fratricide", which can still reduce T/W < 1. In this paper we examine causes of unreliability, available intact abort options, and a variety of approaches for enhancing the safety of different reusable launch systems. We are focusing on reusable launch systems because reuse has historically resulted in one to two orders of magnitude reduction in vehicle loss rate (after a reasonable flight test program).
Introduction
Three Two Stage to Orbit (TSTO) Reusable Launch System (RLS) concepts in this paper, one vertically launched and two horizontal takeoff configurations. All use rocket engines on one or both stages and all have jet engines for takeoff and/or recovery. The technology exists to build rocket engines with extremely low probability of uncontained failure and these are key to achieving high reliability in our reference TSTO VTHL RLS. An alternate approach to achieving very high safety and reliability is to emulate the airplane (i.e. takeoff from runways using wings, landing gear, jet engines, and standard aircraft design rules). Commercial aircraft using this approach routinely demonstrate mission LOV < 1/10 6 (four orders of magnitude better than rockets). The addition of wings, gear, and jet engines greatly improve safety, but present a large weight penalty to any launch system. Making this weight penalty affordable is the fundamental challenge to the high safety Horizontal Takeoff, Horizontal Landing (HTHL) TSTO RLS. The best solution for keeping the weight penalty for wings, gear, and jet engines affordable is to collect the oxygen for high-speed flight after takeoff (less takeoff weight, less weight penalty). In this paper we examine two approaches to oxygen collection. One approach is to design the boost stage to use hypersonic airbreathing propulsion and carry only enough Liquid Oxygen (LOX) to accelerate the 2 nd stage from Mach 10, or higher, to orbit. This requires advanced propulsion and thermal control technologies, which should be physically realizable sometime in the near future, but funding in this area is fading. The second approach is to use old technology in a new way, namely to use the Alchemist TM Air Collection and Enrichment System (ACES) to generate and store all the LOX for both stages while the booster cruises subsonically to the desired launch position (a position chosen both for operational flexibility and safe abort). Rocket motors on the booster and 2 nd stage are then used to accelerate the system from subsonic to hypersonic speeds outside the sensible atmosphere where staging occurs and the 2 nd stage proceeds to orbit under its own power. Both the hypersonic airbreathing and Alchemist ACES boosters are sized to abort safety back to base carrying the 2 nd stage if for any reason the systems do not separate at staging conditions. This is in contrast to VTHL launch systems, which cannot afford to carry enough wing area on the booster to abort with the 2 nd stage.
In this paper we have optimized each of the three RLS concepts for a common mission (9 MT roundtrip to 28.5 degrees LEO) using a variety of engine cycles and derating techniques to improve safety and reliability. Subsystems on each launch system concept were also chosen to improve safety and reliability for reasonable nonrecurring and recurring costs. Sensitivity to alternate design approaches to enhance safety were also included (e.g. engine-out-to-orbit and recovery jet engines on the orbiter). In our results we compare dry weights, propellant weights, reliability, and safety (LOV); across the entire trade space. Finally, we draw conclusions and make recommendations as to where technology development monies could be best spent in order to maximize the safety and reliability of future reusable launch systems. Figure 1 summarizes the results of the RLS Safety/Reliability analyses. The results are based on historic reliability data for individual system elements, operational time lines from optimized ascent trajectories, redundancy levels selected using best engineering practices, and safe abort trajectory simulations. The buildup of each reliability estimate is covered in detail in the remainder of the paper. Note, that the low mean flights between losses (MTBL) for the second stage orbiters is driven by the 1/1000 probability of loss of orbiter during a piloted dead-stick landing (NASA estimate). Improvements in landing L/D and addition of go-around jet propulsion should increase 2 nd stage MTBF to be comprable to the first stage LOV. All stages were also penalized by a 1/25,000 probability of LOV during staging (Historical data). 
Reliability and Safety Results
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A. Summary of Results
It should be pointed out that usually no one system drives reliability. Reliability is the sum of hundreds of small failure probabilities averaged over individual element operating times. For the systems assumed in this paper, the probability of LOV will be driven by two events, namely stage separation and orbiter landing. This means the design can be further refined, since there are design solutions that can rectify this situation; and they will be described in the conclusions section. Meanwhile, we will continue to define and analyze the three systems described above.
The operating timelines used to analyze system reliabilities are shown below in Figure 2 , and the individual propulsion system assumptions follow directly. Figure 3 below shows how non-rocket component reliability contributes to the overall LOV probability. Similar figures were generated for the two HTHL RLS. Note that Figure 3 does not include stage separation or orbiter landing unreliability's. Those were estimated separately using NASA provided data. With the initial systems elements chosen to provide reasonable levels of redundancy the nonrocket systems elements do not drive LOV probability. However, with the current assumed probabilities for LOV during stage separation and orbiter landing, neither do the rocket elements. See section D for details.
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C. Non-Rocket Systems Contribution to LOV
D. Main Propulsion Contribution to LOV
At the start of this study it was assumed that failures in the main propulsion rocket systems would be the largest factor in vehicle unreliability and LOV. We were wrong, but for some very interesting reasons. Figure 5. Abort to alternate fields vs. loss of engine times (VTHL) there are two or three good prospects. If we assume jet engines on both the booster and orbiter we can reenter and fly to a downfield abort site as shown in Figure 5 .
For the HTHL ISS aborts we can assume we launch up the east coast and use the same recovery sites. This simplifies our task since there are an infinite number of air-launched trajectories. For the polar missions, assume a launch off the California coast with a recovery on the Washington coast. Once we identified the single engine failure time periods we repeated the analysis assuming two engines fail simultaneously. A non-optimized case was generated for the VTHL RLS using the 1200 fps DV of OMS propellants as reserves for completing an Abort Once Around (AOA) after loss of orbiter engines. . The lower limit for once around abort (fail-operational in this case) with single engine out is approximately 197 seconds and with two engines out it's 310 seconds.) This is shown as Figure 6 .
Category 2 -Booster Engine Failure during Boost: Next easiest to analyze since systems can be fail-operational.
Approach used (VTHL RLS): Our current VTHL Flyback Booster concept is fail-operational with respect to a single booster engine failure because of a perceived requirement to arrive at the staging point with no propellants in the booster to assure adequate flying qualities. This is straightforward and minimizes loss of missions, but it does penalize performance. This requirement to derate the engines can be relaxed if an adaptive GN&C is assumed to be available. With an adaptive GN&C, if a once-around abort is not possible, the combined vehicles would throttle all engines immediately after engine failure and alter the ascent trajectory to arrive at a new staging condition suitable for separation, which would also assure recovery of the booster(s), and then perform a RTLS abort to recover the orbiter. This is a very complex analysis and requires a tool like OTIS to do branching trajectories. Modeling aborts with an adaptive GN&C is very difficult. This is beyond the scope of this study so we used hand-optimized trajectories. Our approach for Category 2 aborts with the HTHL boosters is to fly back to base carrying the orbiter for any failures prior to separation. Approach used (VTHL RLS) Our current VTHL RLS concept is fail-safe with respect to a single orbiter engine failure during boost in that the booster(s) arrive at a slightly lower staging point with no propellants, but the orbiter has no hope for a oncearound trajectory so an RTLS or ATRS is necessary every time. This is relatively straightforward and similar to Category 1. If we relax the requirement to derate the engines and assume an adaptive GN&C is available, things get complicated. As before, with an adaptive GN&C, the combined vehicles would throttle all engines immediately after engine failure and alter the ascent trajectory to arrive at a new staging condition suitable for separation, but which would also assure recovery of the booster(s) and the orbiter. This is another very complex analysis and probably requires a tool like OTIS to do branching trajectories. A non-optimized RTLS abort example is shown in Figure 7 . The key to a successful RTLS abort is entering the atmosphere at a shallow flight path angle. Booster burnout much above 20 nmi and not near zero flight path angle will result in very high normal force at reentry (8 to 10 gravities).
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Recommendations
A well-crafted RLS design would have every system contribute roughly the same unreliability. Any system or function that dominates unreliability probably needs additional work, and that is the case here. Shuttle orbiter landings are high risk because of the high approach speed and uneven pilot landing abilities. Automatic landings are commonplace in commercial jets and need to be base-lined here. Additional orbiter wing area and go-around jet engine capability could be added for a (steep) price, but this is probably justified if high flight rates are desired. Once orbiter landing has been eliminated as the unreliability tent pole, then the 1/25,000 LOV due to staging becomes the prime consideration. This can be reduced in two ways. First with the HTHL concepts, don't attempt staging unless all conditions are nominal at staging. It's better to refly the mission, rather than risk loss of vehicles. That rule alone should eliminate half the failure reasons (for HTHL RLS). Secondly, disconnect all umbilicals prior to staging and make the separation system elements redundant (can be released from either stage). That should effectively remove staging as the tent pole issue. Once these two tent pole issues are resolved, we reach LOV ranging from 1/5551 for the TBCC HTHL to 1/8597 for the ACES HTHL. These are acceptable numbers for new commercial ventures including space tourism (acceptable because at 200 flights/year for twenty years there likely will no loss of vehicles).
A. Proposed Abort Ground Rules for Future Abort Trades
There are two needs which drive propellant reserves; 1) launch window requirements, and 2) performance reserves including off-nominal ascent performance (e.g. headwinds, wind gust and shear, mixture ratio variations, and reduced engine performance (thrust and/or Isp)). The launch window OMS propellant is only available for LEO and MEO launches but is available 100% of the time for aborts, while the performance reserve is statistical in nature and the primary issue is to what extent this reserve can be tapped to reduce abort "dead zones". It makes little sense to carry enough propellants to account for several three-sigma events.
B. Launch Window Requirements
The earth rotates under stationary orbits at exactly 15 degrees per hour. Therefore a 10-minute launch window (plus or minus 5-minutes) involves a 1.25-degree orbital plane change capability. Assuming this plane change is done with OMS in LEO (must occur at nodal intersect) vertical launchers need to carry an additional 564 fps of OMS propellants. GEO launches don't normally use launch windows so the launch window reserves are not necessary and not available for aborts. Note, that HTHL has a modified launch window since it can follow the orbital plane at 650 to 850 fps. Therefore, the OMS V varies with launch latitude as shown in Figure A1 . At launch latitudes above 56 degrees launch windows become infinite (or until a subsonic booster runs out of fuel).
C. Performance Margin
Early in preliminary design we traditionally carry an additional one percent of total ideal velocity for design performance margin. That margin will gradually be used up as the program progresses so we do not propose to use any of that margin for safe abort.
D. Performance Reserves
As a design practice we carry one percent of total ideal delta velocity as performance reserves. This is to account for off-nominal environment (wind gusts and shear, season winds aloft, density variations, etc.) and engine performance shortfall (mixture ratio bias, reduced chamber pressure, etc.). These are statistical variations and can be estimated using shuttle actual propellant consumption data.
Once we have completed PDR we have refined our design to the point where we can actually calculate the performance reserves required using six degree of freedom trajectory simulations in dispersed atmospheres with statistical engine performance data. Since we won't have that capability for this paper, we should use historical shuttle ascent performance, which will plot into a curve like that shown in Figure  A2 .
That data can be replotted into a reserves available curve versus fraction of total flights as shown in Figure 3 . We are primarily concerned with aborts after staging so the atmospheric losses have already taken place, and engine performance will remain constant enough to extrapolate remaining propellants. In this example 80% of all flights will have 60% of performance reserves remaining at SECO and 90% will have more than 50% remaining. For example, we can simulate the abort trajectories using 50% of the reserves plus the Launch Window OMS (assuming the remainder of reserves has been consumed) and report the resulting "dead zones" as 90% probable.
For the purposes of the Future Safety Analysis it is proposed that we assume 50% of the reserve propellants have been consumed prior to engine failure and 50 % are available for abort. For LEO and MEO launches we will carry the appropriate OMS for a ten-minute launch window. The GTO launches have no launch windows and few alternative landing sites so they will provide the worst "dead zones". 
